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1 Introduction
The rise of European radical right parties has 
provoked extensive research into who supports 
them and why (Art, 2011; Mudde, 2007). How-
ever, the radical right in Japan has not attracted 
commensurate interest by researchers (e.g., Nor-
ris, 2005: 77). It is true that no radical right party 
won seats in the Japanese Diet until the mid-
2000s, but there have been Diet member groups, 
such as Seirankai (Babb, 2012), and small radical 
right parties like Ishin Seito Shinpu1). In addition, 
radical right parties—some branched off from the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and others newly 
established—have won seats in Diet elections since 
the late 2000s. Japan also saw a rise in action by 
anti-immigrant organizations, such as Zaitokukai’s 
demonstrations in major Japanese cities since 2008 
(Higuchi, 2016; Yamaguchi, 2013).
So far, the Japanese media and researchers 
have called such parties and politicians ‘conserva-
tives’ (hoshu) or ‘right wingers’ (uyoku), avoiding 
such terms as ‘radical right,’ ‘far right,’ ‘extreme 
right,’ or ‘ultra-right’ (kyokuu). As such, journal-
ists, scholars, politicians and the general public has 
regarded the rise of the radical right as a European 
phenomenon unrelated to Japan, which has resulted 
in a paucity of research on Japan’s radical right. 
Our analysis, then, presents a rare effort to examine 
the support base of one Japanese radical right poli-
tician.
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Although no radical right party actually won a seat in Japanese national and local assemblies until 
2012, radical right parties and movements have had a noteworthy place in postwar Japan. Moreover, 
new radical right movements have been growing in the last decade. While Japan’s old radical right is 
authoritarian, anti-communist, and nationalist, the new radical right is uniquely characterized by its 
xenophobia. Keeping the rise of the new radical right in mind, Japan seems to be opening a Pando-
ra’s box of radical right politics—much the same as European countries. In this paper, we will exam-
ine the characteristics of Japan’s radical right, comparing the different support bases of the old and 
new radical right politicians. Analyzing survey data from research we conducted in 2007, we found 
that nationalism was their most strongly correlated characteristic, while xenophobia had no signifi-
cant role in steering the politics of the old radical right. That xenophobia is such a prominent feature 
of Japan’s new radical right suggests that this political preference is aligning with its West European 
counterparts.
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Our research question was twofold: (a) Who 
supports the radical right in Japan, and (b) why 
do they support it? These questions aimed to test 
whether research findings on European radical right 
hold true for the Japanese case. The first question 
explored how Japanese radical right supporters are 
similar to their European counterparts—described 
as “young male, with no college education, work-
ing in a blue-collar job in the private sector, and 
living in an urban environment” (Immerfall, 1998: 
250). The second question explicated the variables 
most closely related to support for the radical right 
in Japan. 
To answer these questions, we analyzed the 
case of Shintaro Ishihara, a prominent radical right 
politician who became governor of Tokyo2). We 
focused on Ishihara not only because he is known 
as a hawkish politician but also because his xeno-
phobic remarks have become a prominent feature 
of his politics. This feature is noteworthy because 
Japanese politicians have not generally been in-
terested in migration issues. Japan’s right wingers 
have been characterized by anti-communism, na-
tionalism, and traditionalism but not xenophobia 
(Hori, 1993). While Ishihara is one of the founders 
of Seirankai, a right-wing LDP Diet group estab-
lished in the 1970s, his anti-immigration attitude 
and populist tendency have much in common with 
the ideological platform of Western European radi-
cal right politicians3). 
2 Hypothesis and Set of Variables
Previous studies have clarified the demographic 
characteristics of radical right supporters: They 
are less educated, younger, and do not belong 
to a church. They tend to be unemployed, self-
employed, blue-collar workers, or retired (Betz, 
1994; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001; Norris, 2005; 
Scheepers et al., 1997); men are more likely to be 
its supporters than women (Gidengil et al., 2005: 
1171; Givens, 2005). However, factors such as 
anxiety and discontent provoked by social change 
cannot adequately explain the rise of the extreme 
right (Eatwell, 2003; Rydgren, 2007). The causal 
mechanisms of support for the radical right are 
much more complicated. Moreover, the explana-
tory power of demographic variables is rather low: 
Van der Brug and Fennema (2003: 69) found that 
sociological variables played a less important role 
in explaining support for ultra-right political par-
ties than they do for other political parties.
Attitudinal variables—such as nationalism, 
xenophobia, economic liberalism, authoritarian-
ism, political discontent, and so forth—can more 
effectively elucidate support for the radical right. 
Among these variables, nationalism, economic 
liberalism, and authoritarianism are more ‘strong’ 
elements embodying positive ideologies, whereas 
xenophobia and political discontent are ‘weak’ ele-
ments that negatively react to the status quo (Ignazi, 
2003: 27). The causal relationship between these 
variables and support for the radical right is sum-
marized below.
Firstly, nationalism is the common denominator 
of all radical right parties. Such political factions 
hold that national interest should be prioritized in 
order to tackle various problems, emphasizing na-
tional integration and identities. Although there is 
a relatively small body of literature addressing the 
alliance between nationalism and support for the 
radical right, the extant research has identified posi-
tive relations between them (Billiet, 1995; Lubbers 
and Scheepers, 2000, 2002). Still, the explanatory 
power is rather limited: Sometimes national pride 
is negatively related to support for the radical right.
Secondly, xenophobia is the most powerful ex-
planatory factor for support for radical right parties. 
Xenophobes claim that immigration presents both 
an economic threat that burdens the welfare and a 
cultural threat that destroys traditions (Kitschelt, 
1995; Norris, 2005; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001). 
Remarkably, radical right parties did not look upon 
migrants as enemies until the 1980s, but the “im-
migration problem” has been their most urgent 
topic since then. Their preoccupation with im-
migration—combined with rising anti-immigrant 
sentiments—has enabled issue ownership to gain 
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strength since the 1990s, which is why extreme 
right parties are also called “anti-immigration par-
ties” (van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie, 2000; van 
der Brug and Fennema, 2003).
Thirdly, recent supporters of the radical right 
are more supportive to economic liberalism than 
those of traditional fascist parties (Kitschelt, 1995; 
Betz, 1998: 5). They stress the importance of mar-
ket competition, support the management rights 
of owners rather than worker participation, and 
disguise economic equalization. Such an ideology 
increases welfare chauvinism, targeting migrants 
as welfare recipients.
Fourthly, the transformation of cleavage struc-
tures has resulted in the polarization of left libertar-
ians and right authoritarians (Kitschelt, 1995). The 
rise of sociocultural issues such as human rights, 
immigration, and multiculturalism have reinforced 
divisions between authoritarians and libertarians. 
While green parties embody ideologies of left lib-
ertarians, radical right parties resonate with right 
authoritarians, emphasizing law and order, immi-
gration problems, and family values. Authoritar-
ians support radical right politicians because of 
their demand for strong leadership (Lubbers and 
Scheepers, 2000; Lubbers et al., 2002)4), which is 
the case with Ishihara.
Fifthly, the political discontent that has been 
signaled through protest votes has been regarded as 
beneficial to the radical right (Lubbers et al., 2002: 
371; Betz, 1998; Owen and Dennis, 1996)5). Politi-
cal discontent often leads to anti-party sentiments 
(Poguntke, 1996), which in turn embolden support 
for the radical right, which behaves like an outsider 
to conventional party politics. This is why leaders 
of radical right parties prefer a populist style of 
politics for differentiating themselves from other 
politicians (Taggart, 2000).
We will examine how these variables can ex-
plain support for Ishihara. As mentioned above, 
Ishihara has much in common with European radi-
cal right politicians, and thus we can expect that 
supporters of Ishihara resemble radical right sup-
porters in Western Europe. As such, three hypoth-
eses are tested regarding the supporters of Ishihara.
Our first hypothesis is about who supports 
Ishihara: Demographic and socioeconomic char-
acteristics of supporters of Ishihara are similar to 
those of West European radical right parties. To be 
more specific, young blue-collar workers, and self-
employed, less educated men are more likely to 
support Ishihara.
The second hypothesis deals with the difference 
between conventional right wingers and the radical 
right in the Japanese context. While right wingers 
have been rather indifferent to ‘immigration prob-
lems,’ Ishihara has often made racist pronounce-
ments targeting foreigners. The hypothesis would 
thus be that xenophobia is significantly related to 
support for Ishihara, although it is not related to 
support for right wingers.
The third hypothesis focuses on a generational 
change of logics to support the radical right6). 
While positive factors such as political ideologies 
can more effectively explain the older generation’s 
support for Ishihara, backing by younger people is 
due to negative factors such as political discontent. 
On the one hand, older radical right supporters 
prefer Ishihara because he embodies their rightist 
ideologies, such as nationalism, xenophobia, and 
economic liberalism. On the other hand, younger 
supporters are not so ideologically oriented: they 
favor Ishihara due to their political discontent and 
preference for strong leaders (authoritarianism).
3 Data and Method
We conducted a survey in eight wards and cities 
in Tokyo in 2007 to gain insight about Ishihara’s 
support base. We selected a sample of 4,000 poten-
tial respondents from the voter registration list us-
ing a multi-stage random method, and distributed 
questionnaires by mail, asking the sample to return 
them by mail also; 1,477, or 36.93%, of them did 
so. Respondents were males and females aged 20 
to 69 years. We also consulted survey data from re-
search conducted in Tokyo in 2005 using the same 
method; in this case, 2,887, or 33.96%, of 8,500, 
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Table 1 Scores of feeling thermometers by generation
20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69 total
2005
Ishihara 59.8 58.4 57.0 56.9 63.2 59.6 
LDP 47.7 46.9 50.2 50.8 57.1 52.2 
DP 48.0 47.2 47.4 47.9 49.3 48.2 
2007
Ishihara 46.6 47.6 48.6 49.3 57.9 51.0 
LDP 44.9 46.0 42.6 43.9 50.5 46.0 
DP 44.3 44.4 43.4 43.7 44.7 44.1 
Abe 40.0 42.6 41.2 42.2 48.1 43.7




Gender (female = 1)
Age Age at the time of the survey
Education (length 
of education)
Primary = 9, Secondary = 12, Junior college and vocational schools = 
14, University = 16
Occupation Professional, managerial, self-employed, and manual workers
Economic liberal-
ism (the score of 
the first factor)
I prefer the equalization of income rather than widening the income gap.
I prefer more welfare provision for poor people.
Competition is desirable for vitality and diligence in society.
Nationalism (the 
score of the first 
factor)
It is natural to teach national flag and national anthem in schools.
All Japanese should respect the Emperor.
I am proud to be Japanese.
Post-war education should be revised to teach more patriotism and duties.
Xenophobia (the 
score of the first 
factor)
I am in favor of introducing foreign workers.
I am in favor of the increase of foreign population.
Policing foreigners should be prioritized over promoting the human 
rights of foreigners.
The government should enfranchise permanent resident foreigners.
Authoritarianism 
(the score of the 
first factor)
We should always respect authoritative persons.
Abiding by convention will bring about the best results.
Ignoring traditions and conventions will eventually cause problems.
Dependence on leaders and specialists is the best way to understand 
how to deal with this complex society.
Political discontent 
(the score of the 
first factor)
It is no use to express opinions because governmental officials are not 
interested in ordinary citizens.
There are a lot of dishonest politicians.
Ordinary citizens like me are powerless to determine governmental policies.
National politics hardly reflect the opinions and hopes of the people
Left-right orienta-
tion




Support for Ishihara 
and Abe
Scores of feeling thermometer (11 scale, from 0 to 100 degree)
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samples returned the questionnaire. Respondents 
were males and females aged 20 to 79 years, but 
we focused our analysis on those between 20 and 
697).
The 2007 survey data were used for analysis for 
two reasons: more questions related to xenophobia 
and Shinzo Abe, then Prime Minister, are included 
in the 2007 survey. Abe is from a distinguished 
family—his grandfather Nobusuke Kishi was a 
former Prime Minister, and his father Shintaro 
Abe, was a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
However, they did not belong to mainstream fac-
tions within LDP: they were seen as hawkish and 
insisting on nationalism8). Soon after Shinzo Abe 
was first elected in 1993, he became deeply com-
mitted to right-wing Diet member groups, which 
put him in the spotlight as a hardliner to the abduc-
tion of Japanese by North Korea9). After he became 
Prime Minister in 2006, Abe devoted himself to 
‘transcend[ing] the postwar regime,’ and actually 
revised the Basic Law on Education, reinforcing its 
nationalistic principles.
Yet, despite his emphasis on nationalism and 
traditionalism, Abe has been indifferent to ‘immi-
gration problems’ (Abe, 2006). In addition, unlike 
his predecessors Junichiro Koizumi and Ishihara 
(Otake, 2003), Abe does not have the talent to be 
a populist, which is why we can regard him as a 
typical traditional right winger that is comparable 
to Ishihara as the radical right. 
Ishihara and Abe also differ in popularity. In 
spite of all of his hate speech, Ishihara has been 
one of the most popular politicians for decades. 
As Table 1 shows, he was popular among younger 
generations in 2005. However, he lost his popu-
larity after the 2007 gubernatorial election when 
small scandals such as his luxurious official trip to 
the United States and ordering public works to his 
son broke out. Table 1 shows scores of feeling ther-
mometer (from 0 to 100 degrees) for Ishihara, Abe, 
LDP, and the Democratic Party in 2005 and 2007. 
Although Ishihara’s score dropped by 8.6 percent-
age points from 2005 to 2007, he was still the most 
popular in 2007.
To test the three hypotheses, variables shown on 
Table 2 were prepared for analysis. Demographic 
variables (gender, age, education, and occupation) 
were mainly used for testing hypothesis 1. We con-
structed scales measuring ideologies through factor 
analysis, drawing on the survey respondents’ issue 
positions to three or four related questions, which 
were used to test hypotheses 2 and 3. Although the 
Table 3 Results of multiple regression analysis for the support to Ishihara and Abe
 
Ishihara Abe
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
B
Gender (female = 1) -0.037 -0.016 0.037 0.051 *
Age 0.080 ** 0.005 0.051 -0.027 
Education -0.107 *** -0.069 ** -0.097 *** -0.063 *
Self-employed -0.007 -0.034 -0.019 -0.045 
Professional -0.041 -0.029 -0.026 -0.015 
Managerial 0.036 -0.003 0.070 *** 0.033 
Manual workers -0.006 0.020 -0.001 0.013 
Economic liberalism 0.194 *** 0.104 ***
Nationalism 0.316 *** 0.310 ***
Authoritarianism 0.051 * 0.086 ***
Xenophobia 0.086 *** 0.028 
Political trust 0.115 *** 0.168 ***
Left-right orientation 0.087 *** 0.133 ***
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.265 0.016 0.240 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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data on voting for Ishihara in the 2007 Tokyo gu-
bernatorial election is available, we have no com-
parable data for Abe, therefore our dependent vari-
ables are the score of feeling thermometer toward 
Ishihara and Abe.
4 Results
4.1 Testing hypotheses 1 and 2
Table 3 presents results from a multiple regres-
sion analysis to compare social background and 
attitudes of Ishihara and Abe supporters10). The first 
models focus exclusively on the demographic base 
of the support for the two politicians. The second 
models include attitudinal variables. Although the 
first models are significant, each adjusted R2 is only 
0.023 (Ishihara) and 0.016 (Abe), which means 
that demographic variables have a weak capacity 
to explain support for Ishihara and Abe.
Two variables have a significant effect on 
preference for both of Ishihara and Abe: age and 
education (Ishihara) and occupation and education 
(Abe). The result is ambivalent: while the less-
educated support Ishihara—as expected by the 
first hypothesis—elder people also tend to support 
him—unlike the expectation of the first hypothesis 
that younger people would prefer Ishihara. Gender 
and occupation were not in line with previous stud-
ies on the radical right: they were not related to 
support for Ishihara, whereas Abe was significantly 
preferred by the managerial class.
Hypothesis 2 was tested with the second mod-
els. When all variables were included in the regres-
sion, they explained 27% (Ishihara) and 24% (Abe) 
of the individual-level variance in the support for 
the two politicians. In the second models, the effect 
of age disappeared when attitudinal variables were 
added, although education was still significantly 
related to support for them. All attitudinal vari-
ables, except for xenophobia, were in statistically 
significant relation to support for Ishihara and Abe. 
However, xenophobia was solely significant to the 
preference for Ishihara, indicating that hypothesis 
2 was supported.
In terms of other features of attitudinal vari-
ables, nationalism was the most strongly related to 
support for the two. As far as standardized coef-
ficients show, the effect of nationalism in this case 
seems much stronger than it is European cases 
because nationalism has been the primary indica-
Table 4 Results of multiple regression analysis for the support of Ishihara by generation
 
20–49 years old 50–69 years old
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
B
Gender (female = 1) -0.018 -0.004 -0.065 -0.032 
Age 0.003 -0.026 0.108 *** 0.007 
Education -0.031 -0.021 -0.171 *** -0.108 ***
Self-employed -0.001 -0.026 -0.006 -0.039 
Professional -0.057 -0.048 -0.032 -0.007 
Managerial 0.042 0.003 0.052 -0.008 
Manual workers -0.052 0.002 0.058 0.032 
Economic liberalism 0.192 *** 0.183 ***
Nationalism 0.277 *** 0.360 ***
Authoritarianism 0.072 * 0.013 
Xenophobia 0.087 * 0.081 *
Political trust 0.102 *** 0.130 ***
Left-right orientation 0.033 0.143 ***
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.199 0.057 0.364 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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tor of the left-right continuum in postwar Japan 
(Otake, 1996). With regard to explanatory power 
for Ishihara, next to nationalism comes economic 
liberalism. Economic liberalism is also signifi-
cantly related to support for Abe, but compared to 
Ishihara, the size of the coefficient was reduced 
likely because right wingers, embodied by Abe, 
have favored paternalistic clientelism over market 
competition.
Unlike the expectation from findings of research 
on the European radical right, political trust was 
positively related to support for Ishihara. This find-
ing is partly explained by his 2007 gubernatorial 
election scandal, which alienated the politically 
discontent and led , thereby ‘protest supporters’ to 
reject him.. In this sense, preference for Ishihara in 
2007 can be regarded as ideological support rather 
than protest support (van der Brug, Fennema and 
Tillie, 2000; van der Brug and Fennema, 2003)11).
4.2 Testing Hypotheses 1 and 3
Table 4 compares different logics to support 
Ishihara by generation. Model 1 of the older gen-
eration (ages 50 to 69) explains more of the total 
variance than did Table 3. It also shows that age 
and education are significantly associated with 
support for Ishihara. However, the model fails to 
support hypothesis 1 for the younger generation 
(ages 20 to 49): none of the demographic vari-
ables is significantly related to support for Ishihara. 
While results for the aged are at least partly aligned 
with the hypothesis 1, that is not the case with the 
younger generation. 
Like Table 2, second models of Table 3 include 
attitudinal variables to measure different reasons 
for supporting Ishihara. Here, again, the explana-
tory power of the model is greater for the older 
generation, but is still high for the younger genera-
tion. In the case of the older generation, the effect 
of education was robust in that it was still signifi-
cantly related to support for Ishihara after adding 
attitudinal variables.
Values of standardized coefficients partially 
support hypothesis 3. Nationalism, economic lib-
eralism, and xenophobia were significantly associ-
ated with support for Ishihara, while the effect of 
nationalism was greater for the older generation. 
Differences were seen in authoritarianism and left-
right orientation: the former was significant solely 
for the younger generation whereas the latter re-
lated only to the older generation. This result is in 
line with hypothesis 3, although political trust had 
an almost equal effect on support for Ishihara.
5 Conclusion
During the last decade, Japan has seen the rise 
of new radical right parties and groups, which 
is yet to be explained by researchers. This paper 
posed two questions—who supports the radical 
right in Japan and why?— testing three hypotheses 
related to the nature of the support for Ishihara— 
as ‘Japan’s Le Pen’. We hypothesized that social 
bases and logics that support Ishihara would be 
different from those supporting conventional right 
wingers.
Regarding Ishihara’s support base, hypothesis 
1 was only partially supported. He was not signifi-
cantly more supported by young, blue-collar work-
ers and the self-employed or men. Only education 
was associated with a preference for Ishihara; 
therefore we can conclude that it is lesser educated 
elders who strongly support him. However, we 
could not find a clear counterpart in West European 
radical right supporters.
Hypothesis 2 was weakly supported: there was 
no significant relation between support for Abe 
and xenophobia, which was significantly associ-
ated with support for Ishihara. On the one hand, 
this finding indicates that immigration is not a 
matter of concern for conventional right wingers 
like Abe. On the other hand, there is room for the 
rise of the xenophobic radical right embodied by 
Ishihara. However, nationalism is the most impor-
tant explanatory factor for Ishihara support. It is 
reasonable to expect that nationalism instead of 
xenophobia will play a key role when the radical 
right penetrates Japanese politics.
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Hypothesis 3 was also partly supported. While 
the older generation support Ishihara due to their 
rightist ideologies, the younger generations prefer 
him because he meets their demand for a strong 
leader. However, nationalism and economic liber-
alism are strongly related to support for Ishihara 
for both generations. Moreover, political discontent 
does not account for generational difference.
These results led us to conclude that supporters 
and their logic for supporting Ishihara differ from 
those for conventional right wingers. Nonetheless, 
suppoters and their logic do have something in 
common with European radical right, especially 
because xenophobia is significantly associated with 
support for Ishihara. However, it is premature to 
say that Japanese radical right politics is converg-
ing with its European counterparts. Our analysis 
identified at least two important differences worth 
explaining: (a) the lack of clear demographic basis 
to support Ishihara and (b) the importance of na-
tionalism to explain support for Ishihara.
Research on Japan’s radical right is still in the 
embryonic stage, but we have discovered a new 
hypothesis regarding the different types of radical 
right politicians, parties and groups in Europe and 
Japan. The recent rise of new populist and radical 
right parties—such as the Japan Restoration Party, 
the Sunrise Party of Japan, and the Party for Future 
Generations— enables us to test our hypothesis. It 
will be useful to expand the scope of research on 
the radical right worldwide.
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Notes
1. Regarding conventional right-wing groups, 
see Szymkowiak and Steinhoff (1995).
2. In fact, Ishihara was called “Japan’s Le Pen” 
(New York Times, April 29, 2002).
3. Regarding the populist nature of radical right 
politicians and its effect on voting behavior, 
see van der Brug and Mcghan (2007).
4. It is not always the case that authoritarian-
ism is related to voting for the radical right. 
In the French case, authoritarianism had a 
significant effect on voting for Front National 
(Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002). On the other 
hand, supporters of Austrian Freedom Party 
were rather anti-authoritarian (McGann and 
Kitschelt, 2005).
5. There are complex relations between political 
discontent and support for the radical right. 
For details, see the following review (van der 
Brug and Fennema, 2007).
6. Different logics to support radical right poli-
ticians have been pointed out by European 
studies (Lubbers and Güveli, 2007; Ivars-
flaten, 2005).
7. For details of the survey and descriptive sta-
tistics, see Higuchi et al. (2010), Matsutani et 
al. (2006, 2007).
8. Japan’s mainstream conservatives have been 
moderate in the sense that they emphasize 
economic growth and international coopera-
tion instead of nationalism.
9. The most salient feature of recent right-wing 
politicians is their commitment to historical 
revisionism. For details, see Babb (2013).
10. The maximum bivariate correlation coeffi-
cient among independent variables was 0.337 
between nationalism and authoritarianism. 
11. The results of analysis using the 2005 data 
differed from those of the 2007 data: There 
was no significant relationship between po-
litical trust and support for Ishihara because 
those who were politically discontent also 
supported him in 2005 but were disappointed 
by his scandals (Matsutani, 2011: 139).
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